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This paper analyses relations between sub-national institutional actors responsible for the attraction and retention of foreign direct investment, other ‘governance’ actors in regional business systems - local and sub-regional government, cluster/sectoral bodies, RDA and LEP executives, and those involved in the coordination of skills provision - and subsidiaries of foreign-owned multinational corporations. It is based on qualitative research in two regions of England conducted between 2008 and 2011. Within a context of international competition for investment within global production networks, it explores recent politically-driven changes in sub-national governance, including the abolition of Regional Development Agencies, alongside the more long-standing instability of economic development and skills coordination in England. The analysis is centred on an argument that a more adequate understanding of sub-national economic governance requires the active integration of perspectives on political systems of governance, and embedded patterns of economic coordination, as analysed in the varieties of capitalism literature.

Keywords




This paper analyses institutional actors in England (1) with roles in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), and in ‘embedding’ (Phelps, 1993; White, 2004) existing subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) within regional economies. It covers institutional actors with direct FDI-related roles, and those which attempt to offer non-market coordination aimed at boosting sub-national competitiveness, particularly in the skills domain. Such ‘coordinating actors’ include, inter alia, local, regional and national governmental actors, development agencies, skills agencies and institutions, and employer alliances. It examines how these actors have attempted to provide non-market coordination in the lightly-regulated liberal market economy (LME) of England, given arguments that regions must compete for FDI on the basis of institutionally-derived resources (e.g. MacKinnon and Phelps, 2001; Coe et al, 2004). Equally, it asks whether the perceived capacity to provide such resources is shaped by the autonomy of sub-national actors from the national level. In this analysis, we make connections between ideas of institutional competitiveness, political choices, and spatial politics. As our research coincided with the global financial crisis, and subsequent governmental changes in sub-national political economy, we were able to trace an ongoing process of institutional change in MNC-regional relations. We argue that while the precise nature of recent changes was not necessarily predictable, it can, in retrospect, best be understood through an integrated analysis of the UK’s national business system and the UK/English political system. These create a form of path-dependence of English sub-national (and national) institutions, predisposing them to relative instability. The argument is based on intensive qualitative research in two English regions, triangulating the perspectives of actors in regional and local development agencies, skills-related institutions, foreign MNCs and, where relevant, national institutions.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section reviews arguments about the institutional construction of comparative advantage within international competition for FDI, and its posited partial migration from national to sub-national levels. It then briefly introduces the UK business and political systems, particularly insofar as they may shape both direct dealings between institutional actors and MNCs, and attempts to create wider ‘ecosystems’ favourable to FDI, with a focus on the last fifteen years. After a methodological discussion, we then present actor perceptions first of the regional business systems surrounding foreign-owned MNCs as established by the New Labour government, then, more briefly, on perceptions of the recent reforms of the current government. The concluding section brings together conceptual insights from this research, particularly of an implicitly comparative nature, and suggests directions for future research.

Business systems, sub-national governance and the international competition for FDI
A wide range of authors in spatial political economy and economic geography have argued that a relatively localised concern with the institutional construction of resources – including physical infrastructure, but also skill sets, and the availability of access to supplier and knowledge networks – for internationally mobile firms is a key feature of contemporary economic globalisation. Political economists (e.g. Jessop, 2000; Cerny, 2000) have argued that, following the demise of Fordist regulation of national capitalisms, state emphasis has moved from the protection of nationally-owned productive capital to securing positions in international competition for mobile investment, with economic coordination moving towards securing the supply of innovation within broadly neo-liberal regimes. This is allied to a ‘rescaling’ of governance (Brenner, 2004), i.e. coordination shifting both upwards (to supranational) and downwards (to sub-national) actors, with increased potential for powerful MNCs, as quasi-customers, to affect the nature of host systems.
Relatedly, at the meso-level, economic geographers have posited an increased importance for tacit knowledge in international competitiveness, and have argued that this is easier to transfer on a local basis (e.g. Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). This is said to be the inspiration behind attempts to create localised ‘ecosystems’ within which geographical spaces can compete on value and innovation, potentially creating an increased embeddedness of host MNC units in sub-national geographies.
Finally, corporate externalisation and decentralisation of functions has for some time inspired research on whether MNC subsidiaries have been becoming more ‘embedded’ in terms of local linkages (Phelps, 1993; Hudson, 1994), with an increased ‘depth and quality of the relationships between inward investors and local firms and organisations’ (Phelps et al, 2003: 28), with increased potential for branch plants to take on higher level functions and use more local sourcing. Equally, the processes of spatial and organisational fragmentation of production have encouraged a stream of research around the concept of global production networks (GPNs) (e.g. Coe et al, 2004, 2008; MacKinnon, 2012). The GPN literature has as its unit of analysis ‘the globally organised nexus of interconnected functions and operations by firms and non-firm institutions through which goods and services are produced and distributed’ (Coe et al, 2004: 471). Among other goals, it seeks to analyse how places ‘slot into’ such networks, with regional development being seen as dependent on the existence of localised economies of scale and scope, and on configurations of institutions capable of ‘holding down’ (or embedding) parts of GPNs. Each of these literatures posits causal mechanisms leading towards an increased importance of the institutional provision of supports for MNCs at sub-national levels. In high cost countries, the relevant supports required are particularly likely to include those enabling high skills environments. Yet, importantly, merely having a highly qualified workforce is not enough: Coe et al (2004: 469-471) refer to the need for ‘strategic coupling’ between the resources of places and the potentially rapidly changing strategic needs of GPNs. This is likely to require a degree of what institutionalist research increasingly refers to as ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ – the process of creatively recombining institutional environments in the search for competitive advantage, see Crouch (2005). In other words, regional institutional actors engage in competition that requires not only a high skills ‘ecosystem’ (Finegold, 1999), but also what might be termed ‘reflexive institutions’ capable of fitting regional assets with the strategic needs of the key decision makers in GPNs. The social construction of the supply of institutional support is therefore of critical importance in the international competition for productive investment. This includes both direct ‘state’ interactions with MNCs (e.g. aftercare, c.f. Young et al, 1994), and the creation and recreation of a more general institutional comparative advantage. For the latter, a wave of research within comparative political economy and economic sociology, analysing how the coordination of economic activity is embedded within (national) societies (e.g. Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001), can be drawn upon. This literature analyses firm-level attempts to create and exploit resources in terms of their coherence with institutionalised systems or patterns of coordination. Whitley’s ‘national business systems’ (NBS) framework, for example, emphasises five ‘spheres’ – governance regimes, educational institutions, industrial relations systems, financial systems, and training systems – while insisting that such embedded institutional arrangements are interdependent, and thus cannot be analysed in isolation. Thus general competitive advantage/disadvantage is created through the ways in which overall business systems cohere. So, to take a typical example, if the German system of vocational training offers comparative advantages in some sectors, this has to be analysed alongside the industrial relations systems, and patterns of corporate finance, that it was constructed within.
Such analysis is typically conducted in relation to national institutional complexes. Yet, as Peck and Theodore (2008) emphasize, it is reasonable to assume that sub-national actors of various kinds have the power to interpret, adapt, amend, and to an extent contradict elements of the overall NBS, in ways that may create localised forms of comparative advantage (or disadvantage). Local exceptions to the national rule, of the kind analysed by Crouch and his co-researchers (Crouch, 2005; Crouch et al, 2009) are clearly theoretically important in an understanding of how the effective business systems experienced by particulars cohere, as is increasingly recognised within the business systems literature (Morgan, 2007). One could go further and argue that, in large mixed national economies local ‘exceptions’ are probably essential in order to promote flexible coherence with the evolving needs of GPNs. In other words, our position here is that the concept of business systems should be retained in order to place due focus on the ways in which institutional complexes cohere to shape and guide economic actors. There is no a priori assumption, though, that these institutional complexes, as they apply to particular actors or fields, are necessarily identical across a national state.

That said, while the current analysis is of the relationships between MNCs and ‘regional’ level governance, it is important to bear in mind that, in analysing the capacity of subnational institutions to provide effective coordination, the coordination of the national state remains a key factor. Clearly, more liberal economies face different challenges in dealing with mobile productive capital than more ‘coordinated’ economies. Beyond this, however, there are more foundational questions about how the space for action at sub-national levels is constructed. The comparative institutionalist literature – and, more surprisingly, much of the literature on regional economic competitiveness – has made little progress in looking at the specific effects of political systems. In responding to needs to create institutional supports, there will be different challenges for localised actors, depending on how their roles are constructed within political systems, and their degree of legitimacy with other political and socio-economic actors. Notwithstanding the arguments reported above on sub-national elements of business systems gaining in importance in the creation of institutional advantage, regionalisation should not be treated as axiomatic. Neither should it be assumed to work similarly across national/regional states with distinct political systems and geographies of
governance. It is therefore important that institutionalist approaches to regional economic governance integrate an analysis of how sub-national geographies of governance are created and contested.

The English context
In order to contextualise our empirical work, it is necessary, briefly, to review the general business system, as well as English patterns of sub-national governance as these relate to FDI. 
The UK is generally characterised as approximating to the ideal type of a ‘liberal market economy’ (LME) (Hall and Soskice, 2001): the coordination of economic activity is broadly conceived of as a matter for firm hierarchies within open, competitive markets. This is reflected in the ‘spheres’ that cohere to govern the economy. Within an overall orientation aimed primarily at capturing the benefits of open markets, the state has historically taken comparatively little interest in proactively governing industrial development, and been largely unsuccessful when it has attempted this (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989). The financial system, while encouraging investment in the financial services sector itself, has militated against long-termist attitudes to investment or to firm-level employment policies (Rubery,1994). The skills system has suffered from chronic relative underinvestment and instability (Keep, 2006). Finally, the fragmented industrial relations system has militated against crossclass or intra-class collaboration on productivity and skills (Crouch, 1993); in recent years, the state has sought competitive advantage in this sphere through light regulation – i.e. to minimise constraints – rather than to involve institutionalised industrial relations actors in the creation of resources.
In the political sphere the UK has traditionally been, and England remains, a very centralised country, with state power largely concentrated in Westminster. Regional policies have tended either to be centrally driven according to the concerns of the government of the day, or to represent the ad hoc, and typically under-resourced, initiatives of county councils or combinations of local authorities. The combination of poor industrial competitiveness in the post-war era, combined with a history of support for financial capitalism centred on London, has given rise to substantial regional disparities (Eurostat, 2011).

FDI and regional policy
The UK has historically had a high share of inward FDI within Europe, initially because of close links with the dominant US economy, the relatively open nature of the economy, and London’s status as a financial centre. More recently, the Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997 pursued, as is well-known, a strong form of neo-liberalism. An FDI-oriented economic development policy was adopted early, as the Fordist/Keynesian defence of national industrial capital was rejected much earlier and more decisively than elsewhere in Europe. Enabled by the enlarged domestic market of (then) Western Europe, the state sought actively to attract large industrial MNCs as a partial replacement for declining industrial employment. The ‘offer’ to foreign MNCs was largely based on relatively low labour costs and weak labour protection – within a European Community context – particularly for assembly work. UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), part of the then Department for Trade and Industry, now the Department of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), became among the best resourced inward investment bodies in the world (Breeze, 2010). Local and county authorities began to set up their own agencies targeting FDI from the mid-1980s onwards, and Regional Development Organisations (RDOs) were gradually created to manage public funding for inward investment projects (Tickell and Dicken, 1993).
By the election of the first Blair government in 1997, attracting and retaining mobile investment had become a more competitive business. The eastwards expansion of European economic space, alongside declining trade barriers and increased ICT-driven possibilities of serving UK markets from overseas, meant competition on labour costs/contractual flexibility was untenable. New Labour, while promoting neo-liberal discourses on globalisation, therefore emphasised moves into higher value-added activity (Cerny and Evans, 2004; DfES, 2003).
The administration of regional economic development in England was devolved to nine Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), covering, on average, five million people each. As directly concerns FDI, they were responsible both for seeking new investment, and for ‘investor development’ or aftercare. The national UKTI retained a role as ‘account manager’ for the largest inward investors, and as the national inward investment promotion agency.
Finally, local and sub-regional agencies also had some role in attracting investment, on a more variable and ad hoc basis. The main role of RDAs, however, was as wider business system institutions, with strategic oversight over economic development and regeneration, the promotion of business efficiency, investment, competitiveness, employment, skills development and sustainable development (Webb and Collis, 2000). These areas, unlike the inward investment role which were performed or at least controlled by the RDAs themselves, were delivered through other actors and institutions, with the RDA acting as a broker between organisations, including firms, and state (including EU) funding.
RDAs therefore to some extent fitted within the contemporary narrative of state rescaling (Richardson, 2011). However, caveats must be added here to avoid reaching overfunctionalist conclusions. First, except in London, this experiment in regional governance was not accompanied by regional government. RDAs were ‘business led’ institutions with responsibilities and targets set, and board members appointed, by central government. Boards consisted of individuals from the private sector, local authority representatives, university vice-chancellors, and other miscellaneous individuals from civil society organisations. As is historically typical of British voluntarism in such bodies, board members were not ‘representatives’ of wider group/class interests in any strict sense: they were nominated and appointed in personal capacities.
Second, the RDAs’ creation was also related to more purely political concerns about devolution following the establishment of devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales (for intra-UK comparisons of regional development post 1997, see Danson and Lloyd, 2012; Keating et al, 2009). Appointed regional assemblies were set up for a time, but later wound down as the lack of public appetite for direct elected English regional assemblies became clear.
Elsewhere, Labour continued the British tradition of continual reforms to the vocational training system. A concern with ‘lifelong learning’ led to the replacement of Training and Enterprise Councils – local bodies responsible for skills, themselves only established in the late 1980s – with a Learning and Skills Council (2001), responsible both for youth further education and adult learning. This body had a substantial regional presence, worked closely with RDAs, and was important to employers seeking funding for the upskilling of workforces. However, a scandal concerning the management of construction projects led to the abolition of this body in 2009, and its replacement with a much slimmed-down, nationally focussed Skills Funding Agency.
The 2010 election of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, in the context of macroeconomic crisis and a concentration on deficit reduction over growth stimulation, led to the abolition of RDAs. This is not altogether surprising in the light of historic Conservative distrust both of institutional activism and of anything approaching regional government (Pike and Tomaney, 2009).
The provision of inward investment services has been concentrated at UKTI, with service delivery contracted to a private-sector provider. Local/county authorities remain free to participate in the sphere of inward investment, notwithstanding ongoing negotiations about the extent to which ‘leads’ on new investment opportunities should be pooled nationally by UKTI. However, there is no specific funding for this.
Wider (sub)regional development issues, and in many cases the local element of national inward investment efforts, will be dealt with by the newly-formed Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). Their remit remains somewhat unclear, and is intended to be selfdetermined, but is likely to include influencing how local authorities act in the areas of transport, housing and economic development, and the interactions between authorities and the education sector. Again, these are ‘employer-led’ bodies. They cover much smaller geographical areas than the RDAs, typically equating to one or two counties, or to ‘city regions’, the geographies involved being locally determined. While the geographical scale of regional development institutions may well be a factor influencing their capacity to shape economic coordination, the abolition of RDAs was mainly intended to cut costs, meaning that state support for sub-national economic policy within England has been cut dramatically.
Support for LEPs, other institutions involved in economic development, and firms, comes under the project-based funding of the Regional Growth Fund, which, on an annual basis, amounts to roughly one-third of the combined RDAs budget (Financial Times, October 31st 2011). There is no systematic national-level infrastructure funding for LEPs. Some funding has also been announced for ‘Enterprise Zones’ with exemptions from elements of planning regulations, tax breaks, etc., reprising an earlier Thatcherite policy.
The remainder of this paper analyses how the regional ‘state-MNC nexus’ (Phelps and Fuller, 2001), has been experienced by locally and regionally significant actors, over the period of economic crisis and political change from 2008-2011. It analyses the extent and limitations of the RDA-led model in achieving coordinating capacity in the English context, probing the extent to which it could inflect, or at least manage, the UK’s liberal market model in ways which had some capacity to embed foreign MNCs at a regional level, within the context of the English political system. It also asks similar questions, on a necessarily more speculative basis, of the ‘post-regional’ arrangements put in place by the current government.

Methodology
Our data are based mainly on semi-structured interviews with relevant actors, supported by a wide range of, largely publicly available, secondary information. We investigated two regions (see Phelps et al, 2003), in order to examine the scope for regional variation presented by the national system. As the research reported here was part of an ongoing cross-national project on the relations between regional business systems and foreign-owned MNCs, it was decided that the focus of analysis should be ‘regions’ at the highest level at which there was significant sub-national governance activity. In the case of England, this was, at the time the research was initiated, the RDA region. We attempted a unified analysis of the ‘governance complex’ around FDI, integrating institutional actors which tend, at least in MNC-related research, to be analysed somewhat separately (Phelps et al, 2003, 2005).
One of the regions chosen was in the North of England, the other in the Midlands. We deliberately selected two fairly ‘typical’ regions, given a tendency in previous research to focus on the most peripheral regions of England and Wales. The Northern region, while on aggregate slightly poorer than the Midlands region, has a somewhat greater stock of FDI, relatively high recent inward investment flows (in a non-London English context) and somewhat greater heritage of large industrial firms. It also has somewhat greater regional identity than the Midlands region.
The initial planning for the research occurred in the period when, as explained above, RDAs were decisive sub-national governance actors in coordinating both direct regional interactions with MNCs, and in shaping the wider regional business system. Our approach, therefore, was to interview those with responsibility for inward investment in RDAs, asking about the processes of attracting and retaining FDI, identifying strategically important foreign-owned MNCs, confirming whether other governance/skills actors in our initial list, drawn from prior literature, were of importance, and adding others as appropriate. We then approached these other actors to perform a similar exercise. The selection of interviewees therefore combines an element of ‘snowballing’ (Atkinson and Flint, 2001), with an attempt to retain cross-case comparability through interviews of likely core actors drawn from prior research (Ghauri, 2004). Interviews were based on two semi-structured interview guides, one for institutional actors, one for MNC managers. Interviews lasted between one and two hours, and were fully recorded, transcribed and coded. In total, 49 interviews were conducted, covering 53 respondents. 25 interviews were in the Midlands region, 16 in the North, and 8 extra-regional (representatives of national institutions with a sub-national remit). 33 interviews were with institutional actors, and 16 with MNC respondents.
The announcement of the closure of RDAs, midway through our fieldwork, led to us contacting a number of either new actors who, de facto, inherited responsibilities for economic development (e.g. LEP coordinators), or actors with an increased relative presence in the new arrangements (sub-regional bodies), as well as to contact a small number of early interviewees again. Additionally, for reasons of triangulation, managers of a number of smaller MNC units were also approached for interview. These were typically firms that were reported as ‘success stories’ by development agencies.

What do/did regional actors do?
We first look at the situation before the 2010 General Election, examining direct interactions between regional governance actors and MNCs, before looking at broader attempts at upgrading regional business systems in ways likely to attract and retain firms in key positions in global production networks. We then analyse specific problems RDAs faced as governance institutions, before looking at more general problems of coordination in English regions. 
Finally, we examine perspectives on the newly emerging institutional arrangements. Direct interactions As stated above, RDAs were primarily responsible for the attraction of new FDI, as well as ‘investor development’ work. Both regions under direct investigation here attempted to focus on sectors or technologies in which the region was seen as having specific capabilities. This was sometimes allied with targeting specific locations, attempting to generate cluster-type effects. Similarly, there was a degree of ‘supply-chain marketing’, or establishing possibilities afforded to potential new investors by the presence of foreign MNCs or large British-owned firms which were lead firms in GPNs. Particularly in the northern region, organised sectoral associations, part funded by the RDA, actively sought to attract firms into specific perceived regional gaps in large firms’ supply chains, as well as improving the ability of smaller British firms to compete within GPNs. While RDAs would work with investors who explicitly sought location in the region for reasons concerned with market structure – particularly in deprived sub-regional areas – they generally sought to concentrate on securing relatively high value added investment, given one of the main targets they were measured against by national government was regional Gross Value Added (GVA). 
Investor development work consisted, at a basic level, of being, in the words of one MNC manager:
 ‘a kind of umbrella for a lot of the other agencies which are going to help with the activity we’re going to do’
(Human Resource Manager, auto industry, Midlands)
Much such work was routine, comprising site visits, reporting on issues raised, dealing with these where possible through brokering relations with other relevant institutional agencies, and compiling data both to inform Regional Economic Strategies, and to feed back to national government. Some RDAs claimed to go well beyond this, however. In the Northern region, a functional split was made between traditional aftercare, i.e. dealing with day-to-day operational issues, and more ‘strategic’ work, ‘about challenging a company, where are you going to be in five years’ or ten years’ time’ (inward investment manager), in ways which in some respects reflect the expanded vision of ‘aftercare’ promoted some time ago by Young et al (1994):
‘Hitachi made TVs in North Wales. And one day it closed, and everyone went “Ugh!”, and four, five hundred
people closed (sic.). Well if you’d known the sector, you’d have known that cathode-ray tube televisions were on their way out, everybody was buying flat-screens, but nobody actually challenged Hitachi in that factory, how they were adapting to the new technology. Nobody said, where are you going to be in four, five years’ time, and actually plan to either downscale that plant, so there’s a managed closure, or to look to work with Hitachi to actually bring in new technology’. (inward investment manager, Northern region)
The extent of investor development work differed between regions, from attempts to create a strategic approach indicated above, to outsourcing this work in a minority of RDAs (not those under direct investigation here), while keeping initial investor attraction in-house. One problem, in a target-driven governance structure, was the intangibility of investor development work, meaning this area was often deprived of a bottom-line in intra-RDA contests over resource allocation. In the words of an inward investment manager in a region which had outsourced, whom we interviewed for the purposes of triangulation:
 ‘Inward investment is a very tangible activity, you can see a new company coming in, you can see the 100 jobs associated with all of that...Investor development work was much more intangible, you have worked with a company that’s already here, what have you actually done to help them?’
There were instances where RDA intervention had been central to the attraction of new or replacement investment, and where the domain of skills had been important in this. One large project, involving an auto manufacturer, involved skills upgrading at both basic and more advanced levels, not only within the subsidiary unit itself, but also across local suppliers. This was closely tailored to the needs of the subsidiary in competing with overseas plants, with the training package fitted around company practices and shift patterns. RDA officers were also co-responsible for writing an EU funding bid. In this and similar cases, the idea of a ‘regionstate-MNC nexus’, as elaborated by Phelps and Fuller (2001), seems appropriate.
However, the MNC unit above was unusual both for its size, and the fact that, for structural reasons, UK subsidiary managers had to be committed to participating in bidding for new models in order to secure the viability of production facilities (cf. Jurgens, 2009). The process was, in this case, also predictable enough for subsidiary managers to begin to prepare a strategy some years in advance. The skills domain was also seen as one of the few areas in which achieving the parent company’s aim of a rapid ramp-up of production at minimum cost could be influenced, as other costs were largely fixed. It is also arguably easier, in this type of firm, to make the case that ensuring the upskilling of the workforce and of current and potential suppliers has wider benefits to the local economy through integrating it within a key GPN, thus deflecting questions about subsidies to an individual MNC or ‘institutional capture’ (Phelps, 2008). Regional development bodies, in this case, did help secure relatively well-paid employment, alongside local skills actors and interactions with national government and trade union leaders.
Elsewhere, there were a number of cases where RDAs were significant actors, either directly or as brokers. These included ensuring skills supply for new investors, or for existing firms, by coordinating skills supply with regional skills actors and other local firms. They sometimes acted as brokers between MNCs and higher education institutions, particularly around specific projects aimed at building up a local labour force. They were also a regional interlocutor in the case of threats of disinvestment, and brokers in managing the redeployment of workers made redundant by large MNCs. Importantly, the RDA’s role as a broker for available EU funding made them significant actors in the eyes of managers of large subsidiary operations. Generally, the reaction to RDAs was fairly positive among the largest investors interviewed, who saw it as useful to have a ‘local’ partner. Views, though, were overwhelmingly negative among managers/directors of smaller MNC units, and/or those in peripheral geographical areas of their region. In some cases, MNC respondents were highly critical of RDAs, and/or said that they had little or no interaction with them, even where RDA interviewees had highlighted investor development work with them. This may be due to managers’ unrealistic expectations about what support could legally be offered to individual firms, but also reflected resource issues within MNCs.

RDAs as broader business system actors
As one of the main aims in the legislation creating RDAs was to correct ‘market failures’, it is important to integrate an analysis of direct interactions with MNCs with general supplyside measures at the regional level (Young et al, 1994). Investor development managers presented a number of examples where their aftercare duties had led to the aggregation of skills demands, sometimes correcting very basic failures of firms to coordinate effectively. For example, on one site visited by an aftercare representative, one large biotech MNC in the Midlands complained about struggling to find intermediate level lab technicians, a skill set for which there was no appropriate apprenticeship or similar qualification. RDA employees contacted other biotech and healthcare companies, found similar problems, and, alongside a skills sector partner, ran workshops bringing together HR managers, creating an aggregate picture of the relevant skills demand. The result was the development of a diploma-level qualification which is now available for the industry. A similar case, more surprising in that the large firms concerned were all located within a very tight geographic space, was reported by an economic development manager in the North;
‘Now the advantage of, if you like the sector approach is, Company A said to us, with their investment skills was a major issue. They had to upskill...and they wanted to put in certain processes. We said well actually we’ve been talking to Company B and...in Company C as well, that have exactly the same issues as you around this, we will look to fund a cross-company training programme, if those companies support it as well, if they put some funding in it...That actually benefited three or four biomed companies in (the same industrial estate) because they all had the same issues. Now they weren’t talking to each other, but because our sector team was key account managing three or four of them, we could draw on these common issues’
Clearly, these examples reflect the poverty of collective business representation, perhaps particularly at regional levels (see Valler and Hood, 2004). This sort of interest aggregation is more formally the role of Sector Skills Councils (SSCs) – ‘employed led’, but mostly state funded, bodies which are intended to be the strategic skills bodies representing sectors, establishing qualification frameworks and influencing national government policy. These have a national-sectoral scope, but also have (scattered) regional representatives who seek to aggregate needs at local/regional levels. Inward investment managers would therefore also attempt to act as a bridge between the MNC and the relevant SSC:
‘We’ll bring the SSC into them to get a view as to what the specific challenges are for their business and how they can engage with ensuring that future provision meets their need’ (inward investment manager).
RDAs, again to different extents, also encouraged systematic employer coordination through the establishment or re-invigoration of regional sector employer alliances, aiming to develop and exploit regional expertise, in order that regional firms met the standards of lead firms in GPNs. In at least some cases, these appear to have had some success. Whether they have established sufficient track record among their members to thrive without RDA funding is uncertain. Equally, without RDA funding, managers of such alliances are no longer under any obligation to directly aid inward investment efforts.
Finally, RDAs had skills directorates, with responsibilities for coordinating relationships with local skills networks, including job centres, skills agencies, universities, local authorities, etc. These were targeted at a wide range of goals, including issues around social inclusion, and what inward investment managers saw as the ‘SME agenda’, as well as productivity/investment. Perhaps because of this, RDAs differed considerably in the extent to which skills directorates coordinated with an inward investment agenda; in one of our regions, there was very little interaction, while in the other the skills team was actively involved in dealing with the skills needs of specific investors, as well as having wider strategic responsibilities. This interaction was seen as important in securing the new auto investment reported above.
Specific problems of RDAs
Within the arenas in our remit, RDAs therefore had a mixed record; they clearly did help to mitigate some market failures, and to attract and retain some inward investment. However, they also had a number of specific problems, which are important to consider both in a policy debate, and in contemplating the wider issue of the construction of competitiveness within regions under globalisation.
One problem was the lack of economic functionality of regions. The areas which the RDAs covered were typically very large, and did not coincide with local or city region labour markets. The cities within them often had different skills sets and economic strengths, attracting different kinds of investment and with different economic and labour market problems. Furthermore, in spite of the size of regions, commuting areas inevitably cut across them. For example, the scarcity of relatively well-paid manufacturing jobs led to commutes of 50-70km being common in the largest plants we visited, meaning firms had substantial numbers of production employees from outside their regions. These problems were exacerbated in areas with weak regional identity; although we cannot demonstrate causality, there are indications that regional governance developed more strongly, and with more employer support, in Northern regions where there was some coincidence between RDA boundaries and geographical identities, than in the Southern half of England where, broadly, any sort of regional identity was very weak. Equally, the historical lack of regional governance in England meant that associational governance among employers tends to be nationally focussed (Valler and Wood, 2004).
Relatedly, there were problems of fragmentation of delivery. RDAs’ activity, in inward investment and in other areas related to economic development, including skills, was supplemented by work in local authorities. Although in theory the co-construction of Regional Economic Strategies, and the existence of sub-regional partnerships under the aegis of RDAs, meant that the work of the various actors involved was co-ordinated, in reality this was not always the case. Particularly, intra-regional contests for investment led to inward investment managers in sub-regions seeking to appropriate some of the responsibilities of the RDAs. This, alongside the complex sub-contracting relationships between RDAs and subregional bodies, led to confusion among private-sector managers about precisely whom they were talking to:
 ‘There seem to be all these layers that I’ve never quite got my head round, I think there’s a city one, there’s a (county) one and there’s (the RDA) and I can never quite work it out’ (Subsidiary managing director, MNC).
Multiplicity of delivery was also built into the relationship between RDAs and the national investment agency UKTI, which was co-responsible for attracting investment, and for the largest investors, for aftercare. RDA managers were generally critical of UKTI, claiming that the investment reaching non-metropolitan regions from UKTI was generally small-scale and low value-added. UKTI’s inward investment work was (and is) exclusively nationally targeted, meaning that, in the eyes of regions, the ‘easy sell’ of the London market meant targets could be reached without benefiting other regions sufficiently.

General problems of coordination
As institutions, RDAs clearly had a number of specific problems. As regards inward
investment, they did make attempts at ‘embedding’ FDI, or at least the skills involved, but suffered from multiple problems, related to resources, geographical scope, and confusion among private-sector managers as to their role. While their abolition was far from universally supported – and they clearly had other roles outside the scope of this paper – and while many actors, including senior managers in large inward investors, have concerns about what will replace them (see below), their success in the governance arenas surrounding FDI was hard to measure and at best qualified.
It is also necessary, however, to consider the more general institutional landscape within which UK regional business systems operated. From our interviews, the most obvious point is that institutional instability, particularly of skills institutions, was universally seen as problematic. Compared to a textbook presentation of LMEs, what emerges from researching the interface between economic development and skills governance is decisively not a lack of institutions, but rather a multiplicity of public, para-public and private institutions, each lacking strategic coordinating capacity (the problems found by Phelps et al (2005) for post-devolution Wales are exacerbated in English regions, as interviewees with experience of devolved contexts reflected). This instability was an almost universal complaint from both governance and MNC actors:
‘I would like a period of stability, I would like a period whereby we all knew what was available, how to get hold of what was available. And by that I mean cash and training, and qualifications. Qualifications are constantly changing, we have NVQ down to QVC. So I would like a period of stability so we can go in this direction, go on one course and stay where for a while and consolidate.Rather than just change again, let’s get something that we all think is the right thing to do and stick with it for a while’ (Training Manager, auto manufacturer). 
‘So it’s so complicated, and there are so many different pots, that people try to make it more efficient by getting these private contractors involved in delivering, but it does hamper that coordination and it does make it challenging at times to really coordinate that recruitment and training provision’ (Inward Investment Manager).
Secondly, many MNC managers emphasise that their skill requirements are ‘firm-specific’. This is obviously likely to be the case in some specialist cases. But given firms are slow to engage each other in the skills sphere, it is at least possible that some skills sets are in fact more general than often portrayed. On top of well-known problems of interest articulation, it is worth adding that, in the view of one RDA skills director, the Sector Skills Councils, which are nationally licensed to send and act upon coherent demand signals, are themselves underresourced and, while having some regional presence, lack, in the words of an RDA skills director, ‘the granularity at regional and sub-regional level...in order for it to make sense so providers can deal with it’. SSCs are licensed by Government on a five-yearly basis, perhaps making long-term commitments difficult. While intended as ‘business-led’ institutions, and while senior executives of some major companies sit on their boards, the private sector has contributed much less to their funding than was the original target (Payne, 2008).
This pattern of ‘business-led’ institutions, with targets servicing the interests of private firms, but funded largely by the state and with little general employer buy-in, is symptomatic of wider problems of coordination in a LME, which sub-national institutions can only do limited amounts to ameliorate. There were reported cases where, with EU funding, large firms (Nissan in the North East is one example) collaborated with an RDA to organise skills upgrading that went beyond the immediate supply chain, but these are very isolated. Generally, weak employer associations – a feature of the UK’s atomised industrial relations system – often mean that little is done to rectify skills supply and demand problems without state-sponsored intervention.

The emerging context
As stated above, the current coalition government has abolished RDAs, and with them any significant tier of top-level regional governance, moved direct investment support to a national provider – with somewhat varied arrangements for local support – and created the more localised LEPs. Many of these processes are ongoing at the time of writing, so comment on them is speculative. Although one inward investment manager for a large city was relatively optimistic, arguing - perhaps reflecting earlier conflicts - that much RDA inward investment work replicated local level efforts, others were much less sanguine. One RDA inward investment manager argued that only three of the forty local authorities in his region ‘would have any service of any degree of scale and professionalism’. In the rest ‘it would be part of somebody else’s job that does it almost as a part-time resource, rather than a dedicated highprofile inward investment team’. Indeed, a number of interviewees in local/sub-regional authorities in peripheral sub-regions were very pessimistic.
This prospect of a localised patchwork would exacerbate problems caused by centralising centrally-funded investment support nationally, leading to a substantial risk of increased regional inequality in the distribution of investment. The danger is that national players will see regions as having niche offerings only, based on an over-simplified sector/cluster mentality, leading to insufficient attention being paid either to local needs – e.g. replacing lost investment with new FDI of similar quality – or to the fact that MNCs do not always seek to be close to existing labour market competitors (our interviews provide evidence of this phenomenon of ‘anti-clustering’ in places, reflecting for example the desire to access cheaper or under-exploited specialist labour pools).
LEPs do, it is argued, often map onto labour market areas more accurately than RDAs did, and are the result of voluntary combination by local authorities. However, their resources are extremely limited, and interviewees reported concerns about whether they could go beyond ‘talking shops’, and whether managers of prominent firms were likely to participate. From an examination of the LEP boards, evidence here is mixed, but there are many cases where very large local employers are, through firm choice or non-selection, unrepresented. Recently interviewed local governance actors seemed to be engaging with LEPs, faute de mieux, without any great enthusiasm.
Some managers of larger MNC units argued that policy decisions had been taken on something of a political ‘whim’, and that BIS ‘has no idea what’s going on in the regions’ (although BIS has recently created regional offices, in a partial attempt to rectify this). There is also an argument that the lack of a regional interlocutor might create problems in attracting further investment, and consequently in securing their own firm’s investments. For example, UK directors in one auto manufacturing MNC were in the process of attempting to increase ‘the UK supply footprint’, which involves the attraction of Asian MNCs into the relevant region:
 ‘There I am, trying to bring company XYZ from China to here, they are already supplying us with parts and are desperate to establish a manufacturing base say somewhere within the UK, it’s going to bring jobs which is exactly what the government wants. RDA has gone away, who the hell do I talk to...I had the RDA people involved, and now it’s ground to a halt’.
Finally, it should be recalled that much economic development work was DAcoordinated/ funded, rather than RDA-delivered. There is clearly a risk to existing institutions, such as the cluster-type bodies indicated above, which relied on this support.

Conclusions
In general, the research here finds that the RDA-coordinated system was fairly limited in its coordinating capacity, as suggested by earlier research (Phelps, 2008). Clear examples of institutionalised cooperation between regional bodies and large foreign firms were relatively hard to find. Given the nature of the policy debate in the UK, though, it is necessary to point out that, firstly, at least some RDAs did have some success in attracting and retaining investment by either creating, or ensuring links were made with, wider regional coordinating capacity. Additionally, the extensive ‘policy churning’ over the skills system at national level, a major source of frustration, was outside the scope of influence of regional actors.
Notwithstanding the limits of the RDA-led system, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the relevant coordinating capacities will diminish under the arrangements, both for direct relations with investors and for the wider coordination of sub-national economies, put in place by the current government. The remainder of this concluding section concentrates on how the cases of English regions contribute to a more rounded understanding of the role of sub-national space in international contests for productive investment. The first point to make is that, as far as England is concerned, literatures on state rescaling, and new regionalist writing in general, have radically overstated the rise of subnational regions, and in particular that of particular regions as new scales around which governance activities have been coalescing. At the very least, this process is much more contingent and messy than these literatures tend to admit. In other words, there is a high degree of ‘relative autonomy’ between perceived functional demands for sub-national coordination, on the one hand, and the degree of sub-national governance of the economy, on the other. For England, it is certainly possible to argue that any long-term trajectory is mainly one in which regional governance has always tended to be marginal.
Nevertheless, the regionalism and GPN literatures are clearly correct in arguing that, in the globalising inter-regional competition for productive investment, comparative advantage is often institutionally-derived. In this respect, there is a clear conflict between liberal approaches to governing economies and the creation of the necessary coordinating capacity to ensure, for example, adaptable high skills ecosystems (see also Phelps and Fuller, 2000). Issues of the social construction of comparative advantage have been widely discussed in the varieties of capitalism, or societal institutionalist, literature. Unfortunately, there remains a relative lack of cross-fertilisation between economic geography and this literature (see Peck and Theodore, 2007). In this respect, it is unfortunate that the main referent among scholars in economic geography has been Hall and Soskice’s model of capitalist variety, which is by nature less spatially flexible that, for example, Whitley’s business systems, originally conceived as mainly national in scope but increasingly an object of research at sub-national and transnational levels among economic and organisational sociologists, as well as heterodox economists.
In order to discuss the possibilities for the creation of what we refer to above as ‘reflexive
institutions’ capable of fitting regional assets with the strategic needs of key actors in GPNs, it would be useful to combine GPN-type perspectives with business systems type research. Such research could take as its unit of analysis either the region, and/or specific empirical GPNs, in order to tackle the question of what are necessary and sufficient conditions for the forms of regional embeddedness judged desirable. England is unusual in combining a liberal market approach to economic coordination with low levels of sub-national governance capacity. This raises several questions which require further comparative research. First, do higher levels of sub-national autonomy within broadly LME systems present possibilities for embeddedness, in allowing, through processes analogous to those found by Crouch et al (2009) in coordinated market economies, sufficient space to develop appropriate modes of coordination? Or, second, is such embeddedness more present in more actively coordinated, institutionally dense economies, and if so, what role does sub-national space play in ensuring the necessary reflexivity? Or, finally, is, at least for some forms of GPN, the capacity of lead firms to internalise and internationally transfer localised advantages (Burrell and Coe, 2001) such that the search for embeddedness is something of a chimera?
One important implication of this paper’s argument, though, is that such research needs not only to be comparative in its treatment of coordination itself, but also needs to take fuller account of national variety in sub-national capacity for institutional construction. In other words, national (and temporal) variety in the scaling of state coordination is substantially caused by factors usually treated as external by both the business systems and GPN-type paradigms. Notably, these include political systems and the processes of state/sub-state creation (and sometimes destruction). The construction of regional coordination depends both on dominant social/political beliefs about the nature and role of sub-national space – i.e. what actually is a region and what should its governance actors be permitted to do – as well as dominant ideas about the desirability of economic coordination outside markets and hierarchies.
Note
1. This paper deals specifically with regions of England. The relevant governance arrangements in the devolved administrations of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are somewhat distinct from those of England.
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